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ABSTRACT
Objectives Double checking is used in oncology to detect 
medication errors before administering chemotherapy. The 
objectives of the study were to determine the frequency 
of detected potential medication errors, i.e., mismatching 
information, and to better understand the nature of these 
inconsistencies.
Design In observing checking procedures, field noteswere 
taken of all inconsistencies that nurses identified 
during double checking the order against the prepared 
chemotherapy.
Setting Oncological wards and ambulatory infusion 
centres of three Swiss hospitals.
Participants Nurses’ double checking was observed.
Outcome measures In a qualitative analysis, (1) a 
category system for the inconsistencies was developed 
and (2) independently applied by two researchers.
Results In 22 (3.2%) of 690 observed double checks, 
28 chemotherapy- related inconsistencies were detected. 
Half of them related to non- matching information between 
order and drug label, while the other half was identified 
because the nurses used their own knowledge. 75% of 
the inconsistencies could be traced back to inappropriate 
orders, and the inconsistencies led to 33 subsequent or 
corrective actions.
Conclusions In double check situations, the plausibility of 
the medication is often reviewed. Additionally, they serve 
as a correction for errors and that are made much earlier 
in the medication process, during order. Both results 
open up new opportunities for improving the medication 
process.
INTRODUCTION
Chemotherapy medication errors can have 
severe consequences and are prevalent in 
oncology care.1 2 In order to make sure that a 
certain patient gets the right drug in the right 
dose at the right time via the right route—
in short, to detect potential medication 
errors before a drug is administered, double 
checking procedures are often introduced 
in the chemotherapy medication process. 
They are intended to act as a safety barrier 
before the administration, as a chemotherapy 
medication error may have severe or fatal 
consequences due to the toxicity of the drugs, 
their narrow therapeutic range and the 
vulnerability of the patients. A survey study in 
Switzerland has found that oncology nurses 
strongly believed that double checks were an 
effective means to reduce medication error 
rates and to enhance safety.3 However, as two 
systematic reviews reported, the evidence 
supporting double checking as a safety 
increasing method is weak: the effectiveness 
of double checking procedures in reducing 
medication error rates and patient harm, 
i.e., in increasing medication safety has not 
yet been demonstrated empirically,4 5 despite 
positive experiences being reported.6–8
The aim of double checks applied in 
oncology often is to identify a potential 
inconsistency of information between two 
references: the order (as print- out or on a 
computer screen) and the actual drug (a 
label on an intravenous bag or a label on a 
bag or box of pills). An inconsistency means 
that for example the name, the dose or the 
day of administration on the drug label does 
not match the order. The idea behind these 
checks is that identifying and clarifying incon-
sistencies helps detecting medication errors 
before the nurse takes the medication to the 
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This is the first study to investigate what kind of in-
formation double checks actually detect.
 ► Using an observational approach and assessing 
a large number of double checks allows for in-
sights and conclusions that are relevant for clinical 
practice.
 ► If the potential severity of the detected inconsisten-
cies were differentiated, a more precise potential 
value could have been derived in terms of preven-
tion of medication errors that the double checks may 
have had.
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patient to administer it, with the ultimate aim to reduce 
medication errors.
While prior research has investigated the effectiveness 
of double checks versus single checks,9 10 or the adher-
ence to checking procedures,5 11 no study has assessed 
what kind of inconsistencies are actually identified during 
double checks. To be able to identify the potential value 
of double checks, it is however important to better know 
what kind of mismatching information double checks 
detect. In order to address this research gap, we observed 
double checking procedures in oncology care. The aims 
of this study were (1) to determine the frequency with 
which double checking procedures identify an inconsis-
tency, for example, between order and drug (infusion) 
label; (2) to analyse the inconsistencies identified in these 
situations in order to develop categories to classify and 
better understand the inconsistencies. Thus, we did not 
detect actual administration errors but focused on the 
inconsistencies that were detected before administration 
in performing double checks.
While checks are applied throughout the chemo-
therapy medication process from order to administra-
tion,12 we focused in this study on the check i.e., done by 
nurses after the medication is produced and delivered to 
the unit and before it is administered to the patient. In 
many oncology care settings, a double check is applied 
at this point in the process,10 13 probably, because this is 
the moment in which the produced chemotherapy enters 
the nursing medication preparation and administration 
process. This is the opportunity to intercept any wrong 
information or error before administration.
METHODS
The study was designed as a non- participant observational 
study. It was part of a larger project on observing double 
checking procedures.
Setting
We observed medication checking procedures in wards 
and ambulatory infusion units of three Swiss hospitals 
(two ambulatory infusion units and the oncological 
wards of two large university hospitals and one regional 
hospital). In all of them, the hospital pharmacy produced 
and labelled the infusion bags. In one hospital, pharmacy 
also prepared and labelled the oral chemotherapy pills; in 
another, the nurses prepared the oral drugs. In the third 
hospital, no oral drugs were dispensed by the ambulatory 
infusion centre due to regulative restrictions on canton 
(state) level.
In all three hospitals, the orders were entered in a 
computer- based system, however, only in one hospital 
the physician order system directly communicated with 
the pharmacy production system. In the other systems, 
pharmacy needed to transfer manually the order into 
their production system, which was software CATO for all 
three hospitals. The nurses usually had the order in front 
of them, either as print- out or on the computer screen. 
Barcode scanning was not present in any of the hospitals.
The observer was present in the room in which the medi-
cation was prepared and observed the double checking 
procedures for chemotherapy - infusion bags as well as 
pills that were handed to the patients. As the rooms are 
small and often busy, the researcher sometimes stood by 
the door of the room in order not to interfere with the 
work processes until a check was performed. Most of the 
double check procedures were assessed during day- long 
observations in the ambulatory infusion centres or a day 
clinic. On the wards, we only observed at specific times, 
when the medication was checked for the current shift, 
often in the morning.
Checking procedures and inconsistencies
In the observed units, two different checking procedures 
were applied: two nurses collaborating simultaneously in 
comparing the order to the actual drug produced, for 
example, in a read- read back procedure,13 or two nurses 
checking separately, for example, distant in time and/or 
space from each other. Due to the ritualistic manner in 
which the double checks were performed—particularly 
the collaborative ones—inconsistencies could well be 
detected by the observers: an inconsistency was defined 
as a deviation from the usual checking behaviour that 
may relate to a missing clarity, a question or a remark 
regarding the information to be checked. Thus, during 
the medication administration process, an inconsistency 
is the point at which nurses’ ‘investigation’ is initialised, 
whether there is an error, or not.
The nurses checked the name and the birthdate of 
the patient, the current date, the drug, the dose and for 
infusion bags the kind of solution and the duration of 
the administration, if already calculated. Sometimes, they 
also mentioned the date of expiry and the kind of storage 
that was needed for the drug (cooling, light protection), 
an information which usually was only displayed on the 
drug and not in the order. In some places and times, the 
nurses also conducted the calculation of the infusion 
duration together after checking these items. As calcu-
lating is a cognitively different activity from checking,14 
and because it was not a routine part of the checking 
procedure, we did not integrate calculations in the study.
Data collection procedure
Usually, the nurses conducted a double check right after 
preparing a set of medication for administration. During 
the nurses’ medication preparation process, the observer 
was on stand- by, attentively watching in order to detect any 
upcoming checking situation. When a double check was 
conducted, data assessment started. After having observed 
the complete double check, the observer took a note 
when an inconsistency was identified during the double 
check process. This means, the observer wrote down on a 
sheet of paper when the nurse talked about anything else 
than the information to check, for example, questions or 
remarks relating the medication that the nurses talked 
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about in the checking situation. For the collaborative 
checking procedures (conducted in all units except one 
ambulatory infusion centre), it was easy to assess an iden-
tified inconsistency, as the nurses talked to each other. 
During the separated procedures, we therefore observed 
the eye movement and the subsequent actions in order 
to assess whether during the check, the nurse identified 
something that needed clarification of the checked set 
of information. As this usually led to subsequent actions 
like looking something up, writing something down or 
asking another person a question, it was possible to assess 
the inconsistencies in these situations, too. The observer 
also asked questions in order to fully understand what the 
issue was that was identified, either right after the nurse(s) 
finished their task or in the evening after the assessment 
day. As in the observation situation it was not always 
easy to determine what is and is not an inconsistency, all 
upcoming questions and issues related to the medication 
of the patient during the double check were recorded. 
The notes were transferred into a digital document by 
the observer and checked by the other researcher for 
understandability after each assessment day, so that any 
missing clarity could be eliminated while the observation 
was still ‘fresh’ in the mind of the observer. Two observers 
conducted the assessments, both were trained in patient 
safety, one was additionally a trained nurse (CZ) and the 
other a trained psychologist and safety expert (YP). The 
observation approach was tested in trial assessments prior 
to the actual study assessments.
Participants
Each observed nurse was informed about the aims of the 
study, the measures to assure the anonymity of data collec-
tion, the expected duration of the study and that partici-
pation in the study was completely voluntary and could be 
waived at any point in time. Their informed consent was 
documented in signing an agreement.
Sample
We observed N=868 checking situations and assessed 
upcoming inconsistencies. Of those checking situations, 
N=512 were related to double checks performed by two 
persons collaborating simultaneously; N=356 were related 
to checking situations in which one nurse checked alone 
as part of a double check, thus these checking situa-
tions amount to N=178 double checks. We use the term 
checking situation to account for the fact that a double 
check conducted in a collaborative manner usually 
takes place in one situation, while a double check i.e., 
performed separately consists in two checking situations. 
The resulting total of observed double checks was N=690.
Data analysis
The field notes from the observations were first analysed 
in a qualitative content analysis and subsequently, the 
category frequencies were counted. The objective of the 
analysis process was to develop categories describing the 
kinds of inconsistencies that come up in double checking. 
Qualitative data analysis involved two broad steps: in the 
first step, the category system for analysing the field notes 
was developed. In the second step, the category system was 
applied to analyse all notes of inconsistencies. One field 
note contained a description of one observed inconsis-
tency, which means that for the four checks in which more 
than one inconsistency was identified, the according field 
note was also split so that one inconsistency was described 
per note. Three researchers worked in the analysis 
process, the two observers (CZ and YP) worked as coders 
and one researcher (DS) as advisor in taking decisions. 
For the category development, the two coders first coded 
independently from each other, then discussed and iter-
atively adjusted the categories developed. CZ coded the 
whole dataset and YP coded only a subset of the data. The 
final category system was tested. After discussion with the 
advisor, the category system was ‘frozen’. One researcher 
(CZ) coded all data again applying the final category 
system. After that, the other researcher (YP) also coded 
the whole dataset independently and blinded to the first 
researcher’s codings. After each third of the dataset that 
was coded for the second time, differences between the 
researcher’s respective codings were discussed in the 
research team until agreement was achieved. Thus, at the 
end of this analysis process, the notes of observed incon-
sistencies that came up during double checking situations 
and were related to chemotherapy were categorised twice 
and an agreement was reached between the participating 
researchers. This procedure made sure that (a) poten-
tial misunderstandings and coding errors were identified 
and (b) differing views were openly discussed, in order 
to maximise objectivity. The software  Atlas. ti was used for 
the analyses.
Only chemotherapy- related inconsistencies were anal-
ysed. Two inconsistencies involving folinic acid, which is 
used as adjunctive in chemotherapy, were also included. 
Three inconsistencies related to the determination of flow 
rates were not included, as the calculation of flow rates was 
not systematically part of the double check procedure.
Patient and public involvement
The idea to do the larger research project in which this study 
was conducted evolved from the questions we received from 
healthcare workers in Switzerland about whether and how 
to best apply double checking for high- risk drugs. From the 
time when the project was funded, the public was informed 
on the website of the Patient Safety Foundation, via the 
newsletter and in talks on double checking, the research 
project and its results given at collaborating hospitals and at 
conferences. We additionally published a recommendation 
of how and when to use double checking in hospitals which 
is freely available.
RESULTS
In 22 of 690 double checks (3.2% of double checks), 28 
chemotherapy- related inconsistencies were detected; in 
4 checks, several (2–3) inconsistencies were identified. 
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During all double checks conducted in a separated 
procedure, 9 inconsistencies were detected and 19 were 
detected during the collaborating checking procedures.
Table 1 shows the resulting coding scheme and the 
frequencies of the categories, along with examples. Analysing 
the nature of each inconsistency detected, we identified that 
there were two different kinds of inconsistencies depending 
on the sources of information or knowledge used:
The nurses identified (a) 14 (50%) disconcordant 
pairs of information between the label of the drug (12 
Table 1 Coding scheme, frequencies and examples
Coding scheme Frequency Examples
Type of inconsistency
  Disconcordant pair of 
external information
14 (50%) A certain drug was ordered to be diluted in 100 mL but was delivered by pharmacy in 
250 mL; the duration of the infusion was indicated as being 15 min on the order but 
was labelled as 30 min by the pharmacy.
  Disconcordance 
between external 
information and 
knowledge
14 (50%) Nurses correcting the infusion duration because it was wrongly ordered or wrongly 
labelled or both; nurses identifying a wrong ward indicated on the infusion bag; 
nurses identifying a wrong infusion set.
  Total 28 (100%)   
Origin of inconsistency
  Prescribed infusion 
duration
12 (43%) Infusion rate for a first- time administration was ordered, although patient was getting 
second administration; drug was prescribed to be administered in 15 min, information 
on drug by pharmacy indicated infusion duration of 30 min.
  Wrong quantity of 
infusion
3 (11%) The right drug amount was diluted in more solution than prescribed, thus the 
pharmacy had already corrected an ordererror; the pharmacy having produced 
400 mg of a chemotherapeutic drug, while only 390 mg was ordered.
  Wrong date on 
prescription
2 (7%)   
  Other order- related 
issues
4 (14%) Order not yet cleared by the senior physician; pieces of information missing on the 
order that needed to be filled in; order was changed, but nurses did not know and 
used old order in checking the produced chemotherapy; carrier solution was ordered 
to be sodium chloride but was corrected to dextrose by nurse.
  Wrong or missing 
information on the drug 
label
4 (14%) The wrong organisational unit on an infusion bag; a missing date on a pack of pills; 
a wrong duration for taking chemotherapy pills in relation to the number of pills 
prepared.
  Other 3 (11%) Nurse took wrong prepared chemotherapy infusion bag from refrigerator; two 
inconsistencies could not be unambiguously categorised.
  Total 28 (100%)   
Subsequent and corrective actions*
  Correcting the order 18 (55%)   
  Communicating with 
another person about 
the inconsistency
8 (24%) To another nurse (2), to a pharmacist (2); to a physician (4).
  Correcting the drug 
label
3 (9%) By a nurse (2); by a pharmacist (1).
  Calculation repeated 2 (6%) How long one set of pills were to be taken at home; the infusion rate of an infusion to 
be administered over 2 days.
  Put back wrong infusion 
bag in refrigerator
1 (3%)   
  Look something up 1 (3%) As the organisational unit name was missing on the infusion bag, the nurses looked 
up in the system whether there were two persons with the same name in the same 
unit.
  Total 33 (100%)   
  No subsequent action 4 (0)   
*The number of actions is higher than the total of inconsistencies, as more than one action may have resulted from an inconsistency. 
Percentages relate to total number of actions here.
P
rotected by copyright.
 on S
eptem
ber 22, 2020 at U
niversitaetsbibliothek B
ern.
http://bm
jopen.bm
j.com
/
B
M
J O
pen: first published as 10.1136/bm
jopen-2020-039291 on 17 S
eptem
ber 2020. D
ow
nloaded from
 
5Pfeiffer Y, et al. BMJ Open 2020;10:e039291. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-039291
Open access
bag labels for intravenous chemotherapy, 2 labels for pill 
boxes) and the order. They also identified (b) 14 (50%) 
inconsistencies between information on the drug label or 
the order and their knowledge. By knowledge, we meant 
expert knowledge about drugs, and therapies, and situa-
tional knowledge about the patient and its condition, the 
cycle he or she was in, about usual order inadequacies 
and handling of information by the pharmacy.
Furthermore, in focusing on the origin of the inconsis-
tency, we found that many related to inconsistent infusion 
durations (12 of the 28). In sum, 21 (75%) inconsisten-
cies could be traced back to information that was already 
inappropriate or wrong on the order.
We also assessed n=33 subsequent or corrective actions 
of the nurses in response to the inconsistency detected. 
While 4 inconsistencies did not lead to any subsequent 
action, 17 led to one action and 7 inconsistencies to 
two or three actions (per inconsistency, 1.2 actions were 
carried out, SD: 0.77). More than half (n=18, 64%) of 
inconsistencies were acted on in correcting the order. We 
also recorded eight actions relating to communicating to 
other persons, which often meant to do a phone call, for 
example, because the persons were not in the room.
DISCUSSION
This study is the first to explore the immediate inconsis-
tencies detected by double- checking medications. Two 
results of this study are particularly standing out: first, 
half of the identified inconsistencies were not identified 
in checking two sets of information against each other, 
but in nurses using their own knowledge to evaluate the 
information on the label or the order. Second, a majority 
(75%) of the identified inconsistencies originated from 
the order.
Currently, there is no study quantifying the evidence 
regarding the relation between nurses’ double checking 
and actual patient harm.5 However, the potential of 
double checks to detect administration errors that would 
have otherwise resulted in actual patient harm is expected 
to be rather low,5 putting into question the consider-
able resources and cognitive capacity invested in double 
checking. The kinds of origins of inconsistencies support 
this observation, as many of them were related to infu-
sion duration, or missing or wrong information on the 
order that was often corrected by the nurses. However, 
the plenty of physician ordering errors or problems that 
needed to be corrected by the nurses or by pharmacy 
point to a systemic problem of physician order quality 
that emerges in the nurses’ double check before adminis-
tration, i.e., at the very front- end of cancer care. Working 
on physician order quality in a double check before 
administration is a misplaced use of human resources 
and also represents an allocation of responsibility to the 
nurses that would not be necessary if the quality of the 
orders was assured earlier in the medication process. 
Additionally, double checking is known to be a process 
vulnerable to factors such as human fallibility15 reducing 
its effectiveness. In line with the approach proposed by 
Trbovic and Shojania16 of addressing issues at their root 
cause, we therefore argue that assuring a high physician 
order quality would be more effective than performing 
double checks for attaining it. It also would save the time 
i.e., involved in clarifying inconsistencies, for example, 
of calling a physician to clarify an order. Our study has 
shown that each inconsistency entails more than one such 
action in the mean.
Double checking has been criticised for only catching 
a part of medication errors due to several reasons, for 
example, complacency in performing the checks,17 
disturbing environmental conditions13 or non- adherence 
to checking protocols.18 19 The collaborating checking 
procedure itself has been criticised as a ritualistic chant 
that reduces attention to detail.10 20 The results of this 
study open up a completely new perspective on double 
checking: half of the identified inconsistencies did not 
result from comparing two sources of information, i.e., 
the order and the drug label, but from using own knowl-
edge as reference to review information for plausibility.21 
Thus, cognitive activities like critical thinking which are 
different from the mechanistic thought processes applied 
during the checks, for example, read- read back proce-
dures, were performed during the checks. Consequently, 
many inconsistencies were identified that cannot be 
found by checking the concordance or disconcordance 
of pairs of information: such as flow rate not adapted 
to the chemotherapy cycle the patient was in, or the 
wrong ward indicated on an infusion bag. Interestingly, 
identifying mismatching information in a check goes 
back to a rather mechanistic cognitive activity,22 which 
is performed best when all other influences of sense- 
making are reduced in order to avoid cognitive biases. 
In contrast, critical thinking and reviewing information 
using own knowledge works best if all the knowledge 
that a person may have is actualised. In their analysis of 
checking procedures, White et al22 proposed that abstract 
thinking, i.e., critically reviewing a set of drugs i.e., to be 
administered, is important for medication safety and that 
this activity should be separated from other mechanistic 
tasks. Specific research is needed on how to support that 
kind of activity. Our results thus point to a potentially 
powerful opportunity to detect errors before drug admin-
istration: new ways of integrating critical thinking into the 
medication process are needed, an argument that Rohde 
and Domm23 have also brought forward in their review. 
For example, it may be worthwhile to define specific 
locations and times for the critical review of the appro-
priateness of the drugs for a certain patient. A review for 
plausibility could be conducted before administration 
and in a space that allows the nurse to distant theirself 
from the daily business and to very attentively think about 
the patient and the drugs to be administered at hand. 
The space may be a booth or an area indicated using duct 
tape on the floor.24 Moreover, it would be useful to train 
nurses in doing checks and in doing plausibility reviews, 
so that they could activate the appropriate mindset for 
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the activity at hand. Specific descriptions of the behaviour 
expected to be performed within checking procedures 
are often missing in nursing guidelines, although a prior 
simulation study has shown that checklists for conducting 
double checks increased error detection.22 Our results 
thus point to the need to specifically describe what kind of 
behaviour is expected to be performed in a check and in 
a plausibility review, respectively, and to distinctly differ-
entiate them within the medication process in defining 
specific locations and times.
Hewitt et al25 discussed that double checking also can 
be regarded as a tool for organisational learning as the 
double checks had an informal part in which the nurses 
sometimes would bring up best practices or an opinion 
on how to accomplish a task. This is only true for double 
checks that are conducted by two persons working simul-
taneously. The results of our study show that double 
checks are a potential source of error detection going 
back to critical thinking. However, this critical thinking 
would better be designed to be a separate activity in the 
medication process for the above- mentioned reasons. 
Future research should thus not only address the effec-
tiveness of ‘single check’ versus ‘double check’, but also 
the pair 'double check' versus 'single check plus plausi-
bility review' and its potential to identify relevant medica-
tion errors.
Limitations
The inconsistencies detected were not categorised differ-
entiating their severity and probability for harming a 
patient. This would have allowed to better gauge the 
potential value of double checking for avoiding medi-
cation errors based on our results. We refrained from 
attributing severity to the identified consistencies, as we 
could not evaluate how probable it would have been 
for a specific error to be caught after the check, and 
because we were not able to reliably evaluate the poten-
tially resulting harm for a patient. It is also possible that 
the inconsistencies that surfaced in the double check go 
back to appropriate therapeutic interchanges that are not 
clinically significant. The study did not assess the clinical 
significance of the identified inconsistencies. However, if 
they were not clinically relevant, the inconsistencies still 
elicit subsequent actions that produce interruptions, take 
up resources and could potentially be avoided by better 
process design, i.e., aligning information throughout the 
medication process.
It is possible for the separated checking procedures that 
the observers may not have captured all inconsistencies. 
However, the observers were well- trained and acquainted 
with the work processes before the actual data gathering 
and they had the possibility to ask questions to under-
stand whether there was an inconsistency identified. 
These measures supported a comprehensive assessment 
of all inconsistencies.
In order to reduce potential subjectivity in the quali-
tative date analysis of the notes taken, we applied the 
following means: all the notes were coded twice by two 
coders working independently from each other, super-
vised by a third researcher that was involved in discussing 
non- alignments.
CONCLUSION
Double checking has long been performed to improve 
medication safety in catching errors, specifically in the 
preparation and administration of high- risk drugs such 
as chemotherapy. However, evidence of its effectiveness 
to do so has not been established satisfactorily to date. 
This study analysed what kind of information is actually 
detected within double check processes in oncology care. 
Its results point to a function of checks that has not yet 
been discussed: double checks may work as a moment of 
critical thinking about the appropriateness of the specific 
drug administration. This seems to be an important 
element of check situation, which is not supported by 
any checking procedure to date. The value of checks 
considering their costs in terms of human resources has 
been debated,5 we therefore argue based on the results of 
this study for integrating moments designed specifically 
for plausibility reviewing into the high- risk medication 
nursing process. This would allow nurses to activate an 
appropriate mindset21 22 to use their own knowledge for 
the prevention of errors. Additionally, this study showed 
that errors should be better fixed at their source rather 
than be allowed to migrate through the system and be 
discussed and potentially fixed by the nurses during a 
double check, as was the case with a large amount of iden-
tified inconsistencies that went back to order quality.
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